Figure 1
Model 1 shows a conceptualization of the Doctrine of Concordance. The same cognitive process is responsible for both consciousness and behavior, leading to a strong correlation between cognitive processes, consciousness, and behavior. Model 2 shows the challenge to the Doctrine of Concordance elaborated by Schwartz (1999). In it one cognitive process leads to conscious experience, whereas a second cognitive process leads to observable behavior. This general model can account for why we observe dissociations between cognitive processes, consciousness, and behavior.
Figure 2
Illustration of a hypothetical situation in which an object-level basic cognitive process, an overt behavior, and a meta-level conscious subjective experience are interrelated, yet each based on a different underlying mechanism. Here, the hypothesized meta-level conscious experience of a sensation of familiarity (C) arises from a different mechanism than the object-level process of familiarity signal computation (A) and there is not direct conscious access to the output from (A). Figure adapted from Figure 2 of Cleary et al. (2025), an illustration of the familiarity-flip-of-attention theory. A) depicts the object-level familiarity signal intensity value output from the global-feature-matching-based familiarity signal computation specified in the MINERVA 2 model (Hintzman, 1988). B) depicts an overt behavior: Eye-gaze aversion—an indicator of shutting out visual inputs to focus attention inward toward memory (Servais et al., 2023). C) Depicts a meta-level subjective conscious experience: The feeling of familiarity; in this case, the feeling of familiarity results not from direct access to the familiarity signal intensity value output depicted in A), but rather from conscious detection of the fact that one’s attention is inward-focused on searching memory for something that has yet to come to mind.